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THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE~~SECRET~~

National Intelligence Council

16 Sept 89

Note to: The DDCI
From: NIC/East Asia

Given the fact that
Dick Solomon raised the
issue of our testimony
before Solzky with you
at the Deputies' Committee
meeting on 15 September,
the attached may be
useful if anyone else at
State gets in touch with
you on the same
subject. I'll be on
vacation next week
but can be reached.

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16 September 1989

Memorandum for the Record

Subject: The Solarz Hearing on Cambodia, 14 September 1989

Because of the evident unhappiness in the East Asia Bureau front office at State over our intelligence views on Cambodia, the following provides a brief rundown on the background to the complaints voiced on 15 September 1989 by Assistant Secretary Dick Solomon and Deputy Assistant Secretary-Designate Steve Piecznik.

Both Solomon and Piecznik have expressed their concern over intelligence collection and analysis on Cambodia since their return from the Paris conference in early September. As a result of their initial complaints over the nature of their support in Paris, NIO/EA and C/DO/EA met with them, along with DC/DO/EUR, to discuss the issue. On 15 September, Solomon and Piecznik expressed their displeasure with the presentations on Cambodia by an intelligence community group, led by NIO/EA, at the 14 September closed hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on East Asia, chaired by Congressman Solarz. Essentially, each--Piecznik in a conversation with Bob Suettinger, and Solomon in discussion with me--cited the testimony given before Solarz as "blindsiding" Solomon in his open hearings later on 14 September. Then, Solarz, after closing the proceedings, cited the "intelligence community's" view, expressed earlier in the day, that a three party coalition in Cambodia offered a better prospect than a four party coalition (including the Khmer Rouge) for preventing the Khmer Rouge's (KR) ultimate return to power. Both Solomon and Piecznik expressed surprise at that intelligence judgment as well as at the fact that they had not been informed in advance.

The 14 September hearings on Cambodia--specifically requested as an "intelligence community presentation" by Solarz--included the preparation of written questions, which were fully coordinated within the community; individual opening statements by the NIO/EA and each community

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representative (CIA, INR, and DIA); and a two hour and a half question and answer period. Only one of the written questions (#18) dealt directly with the issue of which coalition arrangement would be most likely to keep the Khmer Rouge from power. Its answer, drafted by INR and coordinated with CIA and DIA, reflects the complexity of the issue (the question posed three possible Cambodian scenarios and asked how each would bear on the KR's chances for coming to power), and provided a range of possibilities for the Khmer Rouge that depended on the various international and internal factors at play in Cambodia.

I believe, however, that Solomon's unhappiness resulted from our replies to Solarz's subsequent effort to draw out our judgments by asking whether the Khmer Rouge would be more or less likely to prevail in the event of a three or four power coalition. Solarz's oral question--which was not included among the written ones--was answered, as requested by the Congressman, by each individual at the table, all of whom, with minor variations, gave the same response: the KR would be less likely to come to power if confronted by an effective three power coalition, backed by international assistance, and with legitimacy in the eyes of the international community. That answer was given in the context of a lengthy, preceding discussion by the intelligence community representatives of the Khmer Rouge military capabilities, the problems between the noncommunist resistance factions, Sihanouk's erratic behavior in Paris, the strategy of the regime in Phnom Penh, and the Khmer Rouge's clear intention to pursue power on its own terms, no matter the accommodations reached with its coalition partners, using political as well as military means.


Although I was not present at the afternoon hearings on 14 September, my understanding is that Congressman Solarz described the individual answers each of us offered on this particular question as an "intelligence community consensus or judgment." On the specific question he asked, given the answers provided, he would certainly have been free to draw such a conclusion. But, as in the community's response to his written question on the same subject, the oral answers followed and included considerable elaboration and qualification. I don't know whether the Congressman cited those related comments in characterizing our answer later in the day as a "community judgment" (his words, not ours), but given Solomon's reaction, I have my doubts. In any case, there were no "surprises" in what was said by the intelligence community representatives in presenting their views on the factors shaping the Cambodian scene. Over the last year, all the issues raised and discussed on 14 September have been aired in intelligence reporting and analysis as well as in discussion with policymakers in the East Asia Bureau.

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In light of the contention of both Solomon and Piecznik that Dick was "blindsided" later in the day because of the answers in the morning session, it is also worth noting that I went directly from the Solarz hearing room to Solomon's office to pass on the results of our hearing--specifically on the three vs. four party coalition issue--prior to his afternoon session. Not finding Solomon there (I arrived at about 1:00 p.m.), I discussed our testimony on the coalition question with DAS Dave Lambertson, who is responsible for Cambodia, and Bob Manning, Solomon's speechwriter. Lambertson also told me he had already been apprised of the issue by Mike Marine, a State Department officer on the Vietnam/Cambodia/Laos desk, who had been present during our morning hearing as well.

I discussed the above with Dick Solomon on the evening of 15 September.



Kent Harrington
National Intelligence Office for East Asia

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